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Improving Business Cycle Forecasts’ Accuracy –
What Can We Learn from Past Errors?
Abstract
Thispaperaddressesthequestionwhetherforecasterscouldhavebeenableto
produce better forecasts by using the available information more efficiently
(informational efficiency of forecast). It is tested whether forecast errors
covariate with indicators such as survey results,monetary data,business cycle
indicators, or financial data. Because of the short sampling period and data
problems,a non parametric ranked sign test is applied.The analysis is carried
out for GDP and its main components. The study differentiates between two
types of errors: Type I error occurs when forecasters neglect the information
provided by an indicator.As type II error a situation is labelled in which fore-
casters have given too much weight to an indicator. In a number of cases
forecasterrorsandtheindicatorsarecorrelated,thoughmostlyataratherlow
level of significance. In most cases type I errors have been found. Additional
testsrevealthatthereislittleevidenceofinstitutionspecificaswellasforecast
horizon specific effects. In many cases, co-variations found for GDP are not
refected in one of the expenditure side components et vice versa.
JEL classification:E370,C530,C420
Keywords:Short term forecast,Forecast evaluation,informational efficiency
October 2006
*Roland Döhrn,RWI Essen,Germany.Revised paper presented at the International Symposium
of Forecasters June 2006 11 to 14 in Santander, Spain. The author would like to thank György
Barabas, Torge Middendorf, Torsten Schmidt, and Wim Kösters for helpful comments to earlier
versions of this paper.All correspondence to Roland Döhrn,Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI Essen), Hohenzollernstr. 1–3, 45128 Essen, Germany, Fax: +49 201 /
81 49-200.Email:doehrn@rwi-essen.de.1. Background and Structure of the Paper
Evaluatingforecastsisanexercisewhichisdonemoreorlessregularlybypro-
ducers of business cycle forecasts as well as independent researchers. Re-
viewing recent literature on this issue, the papers aim at quite different di-
rections.Some primarily take the users’ view and present implicitly a ranking
of different forecasts with respect to their accuracy (e.g. Öller, Barot 2000).
Other analyses try to detect common features from various forecasts by dif-
ferent institutions (Rouss, Savioz 2002; Döpke, Fritzsche 2005). A different
strand of research comes from institutions evaluating the accuracy of their
own forecasts often employing a wide spectrum of statistical measures
(Keereman1999;Kontsogeorgopoulos2000;Timmermann2006).Finally,only
few researchers try to gather hints from past forecast errors, how to improve
future forecasts (for Germany e.g. Neumann, Buscher 1985; Kirchgässner,
Savioz 2001;for the U.S.Steckler 2002:232–233 gives an overview).
This paper tries to add some new evidence to the last category from a fore-
caster’s perspective. For that purpose, some short term forecasts for the
German economy the author of the paper is engaged in are analysed. In par-
ticular it is asked whether a broad set of information available at the time of
the projection has been used properly.This issue is addressed as one aspect of
informational efficiency of forecasts in the forecast evaluation literature.
Various tests for informational efficiency are proposed having one feature in
common: They analyse forecast errors with respect to their correlation with
past data supposed to contain information about future economic devel-
opments and presumably have been known to the forecaster when he made
hisprediction.Iferrorsareuncorrelatedwithsuchvariables,itcanbeassumed
that the accuracy of the forecast could not have been improved by making a
betteruseofthesedata.Iftheoppositeistrue,thereshouldbereasontocheck,
whether the data in question could have been utilised better.
Asfarasthiskindofanalyseshasbeencarriedoutearlierthefocusmostlywas
on GDP forecasts. However, it must be taken into account how short term
forecasts are made in practice.Without going into detail,they are mostly built
bottom-up, starting with forecast of the expenditure side of GDP at a
disaggregated level. These detailed forecasts are added up to yield a GDP
forecast, which, however, may be subject to some fine tuning thereafter.
Therefore it would help little to improve predictions if a correlation is de-
tected between some economic indicators and the errors of GDP forecasts.If,
e.g.,it turns out that the error in GDP forecast and share prices are correlated,
a forecaster would not know whether he failed in assessing the wealth effect,
whichwouldrequiretoscrutinizeconsumptionforecast,orwhetherhedidnot
take into account properly the impact of share prices on financing conditions
and, thus, on investment. Therefore, this paper also takes into account the in-
4 Roland Döhrnformational efficiency of forecasts of the expenditure side components of
GDP.
Thepaperisorganisedasfollows:Insection2,theconceptofinformationalef-
ficiency of forecasts is discussed and the method employed in this paper is de-
scribed. Section 3 provides some details about the forecasts considered and
gives some measures of their accuracy.Furthermore the short term indicators
aredescribed.InSection4,theresultsofthetestsforinformationaccuracyare
presented.The final section offers some conclusions.
2. Methodology
2.1 Concepts of Informational Efficiency
Several measures to evaluate forecast efficiency are proposed in literature.A
simpletestisthesocalledMincer-Zarnowitzequation,whichregressesthere-
alized rate of growth r of a variable on the predicted change f of the same
variable
(1) rf tt t =+⋅ + αα ε 01 .
ε t isanerrortermwhichisassumedtobenormallydistributedwithmeanzero.
In an efficient forecast (“Mincer-Zarnowitz-efficiency”),α 0 should be equal
to 0 andα 1 equal to 1,which can be tested by an F-test.In caseα 1 is above 1,
the forecaster is “timid”, i.e. he underestimates high and overestimates low
growth rates: The opposite applies if α 1 is lower than 1. If α 0 differs from 0
whileα 1 equals 1,the forecast is biased.
For a stronger test for informational efficiency, various extensions of the
Mincer-Zarnowitz equation are proposed. One approach is to enclose rt−1 as
an additional explanatory variable
(2) rf r tt t t =+⋅ +⋅+ − αα α ε 01 21.
Ifα 2 differsfromzerosignificantly,theforecasttendstocovariatewiththelast
observation. If α 2 is negative, the forecast is systematically too optimistic in
years following a “good” year and over-pessimistic in those following “bad”
years.In the caseα 2 is positive the opposite applies.In a more direct test rt−1 is
replaced by other data xt which have been known by the forecaster when
making his prediction.
(3) rf x tt it t =+⋅ +⋅ + − αα α ε 01 2 1 , .
Whetherthefactorsincludedin(2)and(3)doreallyimproveaforecastcanbe
tested in different ways. Stekler (2002: 224) proposes the null hypothesis
Improving Business Cycle Forecasts’ Accuracy 5α 2 0 = ,which can be tested by a simple t-test.Holden/Peel (1990) suggest the
null hypothesisαα 01 01 == , andα 2 0 = and to apply an F-test instead.
2.2 A Non-parametric Test
However, these tests might be inappropriate in the case at hand for various
reasons.Firstofall,thenumberofobservationsisrathersmallhere,sothatthe
results of the test may be spurious.This problem is aggravated by the fact that
in short term forecasts the total error typically can be attributed to a rather
small number of cases in which forecast errors are extraordinary large.
Thereforeitmaybemoreappropriatetoemploynon-parametrictestsase.g.a
sign test which has been suggested for similar applications (e.g.forecast com-
parisons; Diebold, Mariano 1999: 392). A less sophisticated testing technique
may also be suitable because of the quality of the data:On the one hand,real
time data for the indicators x would be required to get a adequate picture of
the forecaster’s information background. These are, however, hard to collect
for many indicators.On the other hand,the forecast errors measured can only
be approximations of the “true”error,because many institutions rounded off
their forecast values to 0.5 percentage points until the late 1990s.
Therefore the subsequent analyses will be based on a non-parametric test
which has been proposed by Campbell/Ghysels (1995). In the following the
forecast errors will be denoted as
(4) efr tt t =− .
As the test is based on the number of positive signs of e,it can only be applied
for unbiased forecasts. Therefore, a sign test for unbiasedness will be applied
at first whether the median forecast is 0
(5) SI e t
t















S is cumulative binominal distributed with probability 0.5.In our case() n=14 ,
unbiasedness must be rejected in a two tailed test on a 10% level, if the
number of positive signs is not larger than 3 or above 11 (5%:2 or 12;1%:1 or
13).To take into account a potential bias,etwill be corrected subsequently by
subtracting the median bias
(6) e e median e e e t
c
tt n tn t =− − −+ ( , ,..., ) 1 .
6 Roland DöhrnThere is a further reason why (3) may lead to wrong results when it is applied
in a way widely used.In the estimate the entire sample of forecast errors and
indicators is used. But this is not the typical situation a forecaster is in: In
period t he only knows thett −− 12 , observations.In the regression,also the
tt ++ 12 , data are used.Therefore,the test for informational efficiency as de-
scribed in (3) may be misleading. To avoid this problem here, the x will be
“normalised” with respect to past data. Campbell/Ghysels (1995) propose in
this context to subtract the median of x in the most recent k years from x.T he
transformation is similar to (6)
(7) x x median x x x tk
c
t tk tk t , (, , , ) =− −− + 1  .
Ifxfollowsaclearupward(downward)trend,thistransformationcouldresult
in x
c being positive (negative) in most cases. Therefore the x must be trans-
formed in a way making the indicators stationary.Subsequently in the case of
non-stationary indicators,their growth rates will be used to conduct the test.
Having done this, the orthogonality test for independence of e and x can be
based on a rather simple statistic
(8) ze x t
k
t tk
c =⋅ , .
DefiningI+inthesamewayasin(5),afirstteststatisticcanbecalculatedas:
(9) SO I zt
k
t
= + ∑ () .
It is cumulative binominal distributed with probability 0.5.The critical values
are the same as cited before.
Thesigntestrequiresratherweakassumptionsonly,butitisontheotherhand
also a rather weak test. If errors are distributed symmetrically, a ranked sign
test can be applied which was proposed by Campbell/Ghysels (1995: 23–24)1.
In this test,the absolute forecast errors are ranked,and the ranks are used as
weights for the signs in (9)
(10) WO I z rank e t
k
t
t =⋅ + ∑ () ( || ) .
WO is Wilcoxon rank signed distributed.For small samples,the critical values
can be taken from special tables (e.g. Siegel 1956: 254). In the present case of
14 observations the hypothesis that xtk , and et are independent must be re-
jected on a 10%-level when the sum of positive ranks is above 80 or below 25
(5%: 84 and 21; 1%: 92 and 13) in a two tailed test. For large samples, the
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1 For a deduction of this test see Campbell/Dufour 1995.Gaussian distribution can be applied after having standardized WO2. In the
present case, the critical values calculated from the Gaussian distribution
differ little from those taken from the tables. As the application of the
Gaussian distribution makes it easier to conduct a large number of tests,it will
be applied here.
2.3 Type I and Type II Errors
When using data to make a prediction,forecasters may be wrong in two ways.
Firstly,they may neglect some indicators that would be useful for the forecast,
or they underestimate their influence (type I error). Secondly, they may put
too much emphasis on an indicator (type II error).These two cases will be il-
lustrated by an example: If business surveys indicate more optimistic expec-
tations in the manufacturing sector (xt
c is positive), some forecasters may
revise their prediction on GDP upward, some not. After GDP figures being
published,andhavingcomparedforecastswithrealisationitmayturnout,that
some forecasters may have been too pessimistic, because they did not suffi-
ciently pay attention to the business expectation index. In the terminology
used here,they made a type I error.If this happened several times in the past,
forecast errors tend to be negative whenever business expectations improved.
Hence,atypeIerrorwouldshowupinlowvaluesofWO.Someforecasters,on
the other hand,may overdue.They may take any indication that expectations
improve to revise their forecast upward,what in the rear view may turn out to
be over-optimistic. That is the typical case of the type II error. It will lead to
high values of WO.To be able to distinguish these two cases,all x
c variables in
this study will be standardized in a way that positive (negative) values van be
interpreted as indicators of high (low) growth rates.
3. Data Description
3.1 Forecasts Analysed
Subsequently the information efficiency of the forecasts produced by RWI
Essen and the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose (GD) will be tested. Both predictions
are outcomes of a national accounts based iterative forecasting procedure,
which allows integrating various forecasting techniques. Hence it is not clear,
what role the indicators considered later play in the end in making these
forecasts. Therefore, this kind of forecast is highly suitable for the analyses
carried out here.
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2 The mean of the Wilcoxon test statistic with n observations is () / n+ 14 and its variance
nn n () ( ) / ++ 12 1 2 4 .In the literature different thresholds can be found to mark whether a sample
is large.RWI Essen publishes a GDP forecast twice a year,in February and July3,pro-
viding predictions for the current and for the next year (RWI : Konjunktur-
berichte).The February report contains a forecast for the next year only since
1998. Therefore, the forecast published in February for the following year
cannot be analysed here due to an insufficient number of observations. The
July forecast has a horizon of 7 quarters.All in all,three forecasts per year can
beanalysedsubsequent.Theyarenamedaccordingtotheirforecasthorizonin
terms of quarterly GDP figures to be projected:
– The July forecast for the following year with a horizon of 7 quarters
(RWI-7),
– the February prediction of the current year with a horizon of 4 quarters
(RWI-4),and finally
– theJulyforecastofthecurrentyearwithanhorizonof3quarters(RWI-3).
The forecast of the GD is a result of the joint effort of six (up to 1993 five)
leading German economic research institutes (Arbeitsgemeinschaft, var.
years), one of them being RWI Essen. It is commissioned by the Federal
Ministry of Economics and published twice a year, in April and October. In
April it comprises a forecast horizon of 8 (before 1997 of 4) quarters,the first
quarterofthecurrentyearbeingstillaforecast,inOctobertheforecastperiod
is 6 quarters. Again, the April forecast for the next year does not offer a suf-
ficient number of data. Therefore, three forecasts from the GD can be
analysed in this study:
– The October forecasts for the following year with a horizon of 6 quarters
(GD-6),
– Those issued in April of the current year with a forecast horizon of 4 quar-
ters (GD-4).
– Finally,the October forecasts for the current year with a horizon of 2 quar-
ters (GD-2).
Fromastatisticalpointofview,itisdesirabletoanalyseforecastaccuracyover
a long period to have a sufficient number of observations.However,the meth-
odology as well as the data background of the forecasts underwent consid-
erable changes over the last decades. National accounts data as well as many
business cycle indicators are published more up to date today than they have
been in the past. Furthermore, forecast methods as well as the personal and
professional background of the forecasters might have changed. An analysis
over a very long period could be spoilt by these factors too much.Hence,this
Improving Business Cycle Forecasts’ Accuracy 9
3 For the RWI forecast the publication date varies to some extent,but in each year it includes the
data for the same number of quarters from the national accounts. The flash forecast for the year
ahead published in December will be neglected subsequently, as it did not differ substantially
from the February forecast.paper is restricted to the years after 1991,taking the German unification as a
“natural” break. From 1991 to 1994 forecasts for Western Germany only and




termine what figures should serve as “realisations” to compare the forecast
with.Inthefollowing,thefirstpublishedquarterlynationalaccountsaretaken
asayardstick.Thisprocedurehasbeenemployedinotherforecastevaluations
too (e.g.Kirchgässner,Savioz 2001:358).It seems plausible since the first “of-
ficial” data are based mostly on the information which also forms the back-
ground of the forecast. Later revisions may be substantial, but they hardly
could have been anticipated,in particular if they emerge from new definitions





much from the values calculated for other forecasts published at the same
time.Hence,the predictions analysed here seem to be state of the art.
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RWI (RWI-7) 7 July 1.26 2.87 1.03
IMF 6 September 1.22 2.93 0.96
GD (GD-6) 6 October 0.99 1.47 0.64
Sachverständigenrat 6 November 0.84 1.17 0.47
EU 6 November 0.91 1.32 0.56
OECD 6 December 0.92 1.35 0.45
Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 5 January 0.75 0.90 0.49
RWI (RWI-4) 4 February 0.76 0.98 0.54
IMF 4 April 0.53 0.45 0.11
GD (GD-4) 4 April 0.57 0.48 0.09
EU 3 May 0.55 0.50 0.11
OECD 3 June 0.49 0.45 0.06
RWI (RWI-3) 3 July 0.40 0.30 0.16
GD (GD-2) 2 October 0.17 0.04 0.05
Author’s computations.
Table 1As already noted,short term predictions are mostly made bottom up.Even if
in the very short run (1–2 quarters) the sectoral production forecasts also may
play an important role, in the end the forecasts are dominated by projections
of the demand side of GDP.Therefore,in addition to GDP also the efficiency
of forecasts of the demand categories will be analysed.Attention will be paid
to private (PC) and public consumption expenditure (GC), investment in
equipment (IEQ) and structures (IS), and, finally, exports (EX) and imports
(IM).
Table 2 presents some statistics of the accuracy of the demand side forecasts,
taking the RWI-4 and GD-4 forecasts as examples.It clearly can be seen that
the accuracy of the GDP forecast is owed to compensating errors:For almost
each component, government consumption being the only exception, the
forecast error is by far larger than that for GDP. Investment in equipment
shows the largest error,and the forecasts are markedly biased upward.Large
errors also occur in export and import forecasts. The somewhat better per-
formance of GD-4 compared to RWI-4 is partly owed to the fact that the first
is published at a minimum of 4 weeks later than the second which allows to
make use of additional information helping to improve accuracy.
3.2 Short Term Indicators Employed
Thereisnoclearruleathand,whichshorttermindicatorsshouldbeemployed
in the tests to follow. As a rule, forecasters use many data for their work.
Therefore, numerous variables could be tested whether they were used effi-
ciently and a selection has to be made to restrict the scope of the further
analysis.Subsequentlyfivetypesofvariableswillbeconsidered(foradetailed
documentation of the indicators see annex.):
– Economicsentimentvariables:Threeindicatorswillbeused:ifobusinesscli-
mate (IFOC), ifo business expectations (IFOE) and the consumer senti-
Improving Business Cycle Forecasts’ Accuracy 11
Accuracy of RWI-4 and GD-4 Forecasts of the Annual Growth of GDP Components
1991–2004
RWI-4 GD-4
MAFE MSFE BIAS MAFE MSFE BIAS
Private consumption 0,91 1,12 0,61 0,71 0,75 0,30
Government consumption 0,69 0,64 –0,19 0,69 0,63 –0,20
Investment in
equipment 4,61 31,27 3,61 3,71 21,14 2,46
structures 2,78 9,26 1,72 2,53 9,05 0,84
Export 3,33 17,04 0,76 2,90 11,11 0,03
Import 3,14 22,68 1,40 3,19 18,05 1,11
GDP 0,76 0,98 0,54 0,51 0,43 0,11
Author’s computations
Table 2ment index (CSI) which is published by the European Commission. IFOC
and IFOE are available during the last week of each month presenting the
results for current month. For our test it is assumed that the forecasters
know the data of the month before their forecast is published.The CSI is is-
sued with a longer lag. It is assumed forecasters know the result of the last
but one month.For forecasts published in July,e.g.,the May CSI is included
in our test.
– Three variants of leading indicators from official sources are considered:
Total(NOMT)aswellasforeignnewordersinmanufacturing(NOMF)are
published by the German statistical office approximately 6 weeks after the
end of the month the data were collected. New orders in construction
(NOC) are issued about 2 weeks later. When forecasters issue their July
forecast,theyknowtheMaydataonorderbooksasarule.Astherearehuge
short term fluctuations in the data sometimes,they are smoothed by calcu-
lating two month averages of seasonal adjusted indicators. Using month
over month changes makes sure that the data are stationary.
– Various interest rates as well as the real effective exchange rate are consid-
ered as monetary variables. These data are available very shortly after the
end of a month. Therefore averages of the rates for the month before the
forecast is published are included in the analysis.Thus,the yield curve (YC
= long term rate LR minus short term rate SR),and the real short term rate
(RSR) as an indicator of monetary policy stance.As monetary policy often
shows its impact with long lags,also averages of the short term (SR-1) ,the
longterm(LR-1),andtherealshortterminterestrate(RSR-1)aswellasof
the yield curve (YC-1) over the entire year before the forecast are intro-
ducedintoourcalculations.Kirchgässner/Savioz(2001)foundacorrelation
between forecast errors and interest rates when they tested for such long
lags4. As the interest rates are already stationary, no transformation is re-
quired.Furthermore the real effective exchange rate is included as a mone-
tary indicator, in two variants: the year over year change in the last month
(REER) as well as of the average of the last three months (REER3).
– As financial market indicators share price index CDAX is included in our
study. Again, two transformations are tested: Firstly, the year over year
changeinthemonthbeforetheforecast(CDAX)ispublished,secondlythe
change of the three previous months (CDAX3).
– Finally, the OECD composite leading indicator (OECD) is tested. It com-
bines various data already considered here,namely the ifo business climate
(IFOC)andtotalnewordersinmanufacturing(NOMT)withfinancialdata
(YC) and additional information taken from the ifo business survey
(OECD 2002:31).
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4 We refrained from including monetary aggregates such as M3 into the calculations as there is a
break in the time series due to the start of EMU.All these indicators are available at least back to 1979,CSI being the only ex-
ception (since 1985).The calculate the “centered”indicators according to (7),
the median of the observations over the last 10 years is subtracted from the
figure included in the test; the median has been calculated for monthly data.
Before 1991 West German data have been used, thereafter data for unified
Germany.
4. Results of the Tests
In a first step it is tested whether the forecasts considered are unbiased
(table3).Asthisisnotthecaseinparticularfortheprojectionswithlongerho-
rizons and for most of the forecasts of private consumption expenditure (PC),
the correction described in (6) has been applied to all forecasts. After this
transformation the rank signed test is calculated.
Table4summarizestheresultsoftheorthogonalitytest.In100outof798com-
binations of indicators, economic aggregates and forecasts co-variation was
found which was significant at least at a 10%-level. Before making reference
to specific results,some more general conclusions can be presented first:
– In many cases (45 out of 100) a co-variation between forecast errors and
economic indicators is significant at a 10%-level only,giving a rather weak
indication for possibilities to improve forecasts.
– Thereisnoindicationthatthetwoforecastersexploitthedatainadifferent
way; in 44 cases a co-variation of indicators with the RWI forecast errors
was found,in 56 cases with the GD forecast errors.χ
2 shows that the differ-
ences are not significant.
– Comparing forecasts of different horizons, a closer look at the indicators
might help to improve the forecasts with a 4 months horizon in particular
(40 cases). A smaller number of significant correlations was found for the
forecast with longer (RWI-7,GD-6:29 cases) as well with a shorter horizon
(RWI-3,GD-4:31 cases).
– Most correlations (30) are observed with errors in GDP forecasts. On the
other hand, only in 6 cases errors in investment in struktures forecasts
covariatesignificantlywithanyoftheindicatorsconsidered.Forgoverment
consuption the number of correlations is quite small (9), too. For invest-
ment in equipment,which is the forecast with the highest average error,15
cases of significant correlations are observed.
– If a correlation is detected between an indicator and GDP,the same indica-
tor as a rule does not covariate with one of the demand side components of
GDP et vice versa.
– Type I errors (72 out of 100) predominate,i.e.forecasters make insufficient
use of some indicators.On the other hand,they over-estimate the impact of
Improving Business Cycle Forecasts’ Accuracy 13the indicators only in a few cases. In the RWI forecasts the type II error is
more common (21 cases) than in the GD forecasts.
Addressing some specific findings, an outstanding result is the strong corre-
lation of changes in the OECD leading indicator with errors of the forecasts
with relative long horizons, in particular the GD-6 forecast. Indeed, OECD
(2002: 33) shows in hindsight that some turning points in the business cycle
were indicated by the OECD index with a rather long lead in the 1990s. This
was particularly true for the start of the downturn in 1992 and the recovery in
1993. The forecasters obviously were not aware of these interrelations in the
past. But surprisingly the result for GDP is not mirrored in any of the GDP
components.
One important source for calculating the OECD leading indicator is the ifo
business survey. Therefore, it is not very surprising that forecast errors also
covariatewithifobusinessexpectations.However,itisabitsurprisingthatthe
survey contains some information that might help to improve even the GD-6
forecast, because the companies were asked to assess their expectation over
the next six months only. But again, this interrelation is not mirrored in the
components of GDP.
Finally,a strong correlation is also found between errors in the GDP forecast
of GD-4 and GD-2 on the one hand and share prices on the other hand. At
least in GD-4 the forecast error of exports also shows some co-variation with
changes in share prices. Other channels through which the share market can
be expected to influence GDP growth seem to have been taken into account
correctly: Neither private consumption expenditure nor investment in
equipment show any interrelation.
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Test for BIAS of the Forecasts Considered1
1991–2004,S-values and their level of significance
RWI-7 RWI-4 RWI-3 GD-6 GD-4 GD-2
GDP 12** 10 8 10 7 8
Private consumption (PC) 12** 12** 10 12** 10 7
Government consumption (GC) 765562 * *
Investment in equipment (IEQ) 11* 11* 11* 10 9 9
Investment in structures (IS) 10 11* 9 10 10 6
Exports (EX) 988856
Imports (IM) 989879
Author's computations. – 1See eq. (8). For abbreviations see tables 1. Level of significance: ***
1%;** 5%;* 10%.
Table 3Improving Business Cycle Forecasts’ Accuracy 15
Test for Information Efficiency Based on a Ranked Sign Test1
1991–2004
Indicator RWI-7 RWI-4 RWI-3 GD-6 GD-4 GD-2
ifo business expectations
(IFOE)
































































Table 416 Roland Döhrn
Test for Information Efficiency Based on a Ranked Sign Test1
1991–2004
Indicator RWI-7 RWI-4 RWI-3 GD-6 GD-4 GD-2































































Table 4 cont.5. Conclusions
When evaluating their prediction errors,forecasters are in a dilemma to some
extent. If their projections are unbiased and efficient, they have done a good
job.But there is no lesson how to improve future forecasts,with no respect to
the past accuracy.If errors appear to be systematic,this signals that not all in-
formation has been taken into account in an appropriate way. But this offers
the chance to improve the quality in the future. This paper scrutinizes the in-
formation efficiency of German short term forecasts in order to evaluate,
whether past forecast errors provide lessons for the future.
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Test for Information Efficiency Based on a Ranked Sign Test1
1991–2004














































Author’s computations. – 1See eq. (10). For abbreviations see text and Annex.- Level of signifi-
cance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
Table 4 cont.Even though correlations between short term indicators and forecast errors
were found in a considerable number of cases,the results give little reason for
optimism that a better use of information may help to improve forecast ac-
curacy.Quite often the correlations show a low level of significance.There are
onlyafewcandidateswhoseabilitytoimproveforecastsshouldbescrutinized
more thoroughly. One of them is the OECD leading indicator and another
share prices. More important is that co-variations are detected mostly either
forGDPonlyandnotforanyofitsdemandsidecomponents,ortheyappearin
some components, but not in GDP. As short term forecasts are made bottom
up,the study gives no hint,where to integrate additional iformation.
However, the limitations of this analysis should not be forgotten. Firstly, the
selectionofindicatorsaswellasthechoiceoflagsisarbitrary.Maybeotherin-
dicators or longer lags show better results. Secondly, only pair wise corre-
lations are calculated.It is not tested,whether forecasters draw the right con-
clusions from combinations of indicators.
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Indicator Source Transformation Lag1
CSI Consumer Sentiment Index Europ.Comm. seasonally adjusted t-2
CDAX Share price index CDAX Bundesbank year over year change t-1
CDAX3 Share price index CDAX Bundesbank 3 month moving average,
year over year change t-1
IFOC ifo business climate,manu-
facturing
ifo seasonally adjusted t-1
IFOE ifo business expectations,
manufacturing
ifo seasonally adjusted t-1
LR Long term interest rate,




LR-1 Long term interest rate,
10 year sgovernment bond
yields
Bundesbank 12 month moving average
t-1
NOC New orders construction
sector
Destatis year over year change t-2
NOMF New foreign orders manu-
facturing sector
Destatis 2 month moving average,
month over month change t-2
NOMT New orders manufacturing
sector
Destatis 2 month moving average,
month over month change t-2
OECD OECD leading indicator
Germany
OECD 2 month moving average,
month over month change t-2
REER Real effective exchange rate;
Index of price competitive-




Bundesbank year over year change
t-1
REER3 Real effective exchange rate
(see above)
Bundesbank 3 month moving average,
year over year change t-1
RSR Real short term interest rate;
short term rate (SR) deflated
by consumer price inflation
Bundesbank –
t-1
RSR-1 Real short term interest rate;
short term rate (SR) deflated
by consumer price inflation
Bundesbank 12 month moving average
t-1
SR Short term interest rate,
3 month Euribor
Bundesbank – t-1
SR-1 Short term interest rate,
3 month Euribor
Bundesbank 12 month moving average t-1
YC Interest rate spread;long
term minus short term rate
Bundesbank – t-1
YC-1 Interest rate spread;long
term (LR) minus short term
rate (SR)
Bundesbank 12 month moving average
t-1
1t-1indicatesthatforforecastse.g.publishedinMarchtheFebruaryresultsoftheindicatorwere
included in the study.